Somalia Country Report:
Children & Security

The Roméo Dallaire Child Soldiers Initiative

Updated as of 31 January 2017

www.childsoldiers.org

info@childsoldiers.org
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Background .......................................................................................................................... 4
   Map of Somalia .................................................................................................................... 4
   Children in Somalia – Struggle Within Conflict ................................................................ 5

II. Security Situation ................................................................................................................. 7
   1. Context ............................................................................................................................. 7
   2. State, Non-State, and International Actors ..................................................................... 10
      a) State Actors .................................................................................................................. 10
         Government Forces ......................................................................................................... 10
      b) Regional Actors ............................................................................................................. 15
         Regional Security Forces ................................................................................................. 15
         AMISOM .......................................................................................................................... 16
         Kenya ............................................................................................................................... 17
         Ethiopia ............................................................................................................................ 18
      c) Non-State Actors ........................................................................................................... 11
         Al-Shabaab ....................................................................................................................... 11
         ASWJ ............................................................................................................................... 13
         Ras Kamboni Movement ................................................................................................. 14
         Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) ........................................................................ 15
      d) International Actors ..................................................................................................... 15
         UNSOM ............................................................................................................................ 18
         EU ..................................................................................................................................... 18
         United States (US) ........................................................................................................... 19

III. Child Protection Concerns .................................................................................................. 19
   1. Recruitment and Use of Children .................................................................................... 19
   2. Trafficking and Child Labour .......................................................................................... 21
   3. Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) ................................................................. 23
   4. Education ........................................................................................................................ 25
   5. Access to Healthcare ....................................................................................................... 26
   6. Maritime Piracy ............................................................................................................... 27

Annex I: List of Abbreviations ................................................................................................. 29
I. BACKGROUND

Map of Somalia¹

Children in Somalia – Struggle Within Conflict

After more than two decades of violence and political turmoil the security situation within Somalia remains highly volatile despite significant political developments, greatly impacting children. In 2016 and 2015, Somalia saw an increase in inter-clan conflict as well as attacks by Al-Shabaab against the Somali National Army (SNA), government officials and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), resulting in a spike in the number of grave violations against children. Somali children are increasingly vulnerable to all forms of violence, abuse and exploitation, much of which is practiced in a climate of impunity, conflict, and instability. All parties to the conflict are alleged to be responsible for crimes under international law and for human rights violations, and as one of the world’s poorest countries, Somalia is reported to be the least protective environment for children in the world.

Somalia became the 196th state to ratify the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 1 October 2015. Nonetheless, the scale and nature of grave violations against children has increased since 2015, with 477 incidents of grave violations affecting 854 children in the last quarter of 2016 alone. Children in Somalia are killed and maimed by indiscriminate attacks, including improvised explosive devices (IED), and airstrikes from Kenyan and Ethiopian forces, with more than 3,400 children killed since 2012. Children continue to be recruited to armed forces, with recruitment at its highest level in 2016 since 2012. Since 2012, 6,163 boys and girls have been recruited and used. The United Nations (UN) has also observed an increased ‘pattern of abduction’, attributed to recruitment of children – primarily by Al-Shabaab and clan

---


5 UNICEF Child protection in Somalia.


8 See December 2016 SG Report Children and Armed Conflict.
militias - and for purposes of sexual violence (including forced marriage). Further compounding this abuse, national and other security forces continue to detain children associated with armed groups often without due process, while Al-Shabaab publicly executes children both as punishment for suspicion of spying, and to instil fear in the civilian population. AMISOM has also reportedly detained children. Hospitals and schools have also come under attack, with 235 incidents between 2012 and 2016. The first six months of 2016 also saw the dramatic increase in the attack and use of schools and hospitals.

UNICEF notes that special protection is needed in Somalia for a number of categories of children including, inter alia, those who have been internally displaced, who come from minority groups or poor families, orphans, children with special needs, and children associated with armed militia. More than five million people, or 40 per cent of the population, are in need of humanitarian assistance. Somali society is also severely challenged to protect its children, with over 1.1 million Somalis in protracted internal displacement. This continued displacement, and the recent trend of Somalis returning from neighbouring countries such as Yemen, has ‘the potential to further exacerbate the situation’. However, while family separations, sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), forced recruitment and abductions are among the main violations against displaced children, the dire threat facing Somali children is not limited to conflict. In 2016, as in 2015, environmental events conspired to increase protection challenges, including flooding as a result of the El Niño phenomenon, drought, and outbreaks of infectious disease. Currently,

---

9 2016 SG Children and Armed Conflict Report, para. 118.
12 December 2016 SG Report Children and Armed Conflict, para. 49.
approximately 40 per cent of Somalis require urgent, life-saving livelihood support and an estimated 320,000 children under the age of five years are acutely malnourished, 50,000 of whom are severely malnourished and at risk of death. It is to be noted that monitoring and reporting activities are hindered in Somalia by the security situation, ongoing military operations as well as limited access to affected populations.

II. SECURITY SITUATION

1. Context

Somalia continues to be a complex political, security, and development environment marked by poverty, famine, and recurring violence. Since the collapse of President Said Barre’s government by combined northern and southern clan-based forces in 1991, conflict has become the single constant. Without a central government, various Somali factions, sometimes with the support of outside forces, have continued to fight over control of parts, or all, of the Somali territory.

Building on the 2004 interim Somali transitional government, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) was formed in 2012 leading to clashes with Puntland and between pro-Federal Government forces and Ahl Al-Sunnah wal Jama’a (ASWJ). Some progress has been made to re-establish state structures and bring stability to the country. Federal state structures showed progress in 2015, including the development of a framework for political transition for 2016. Although progress is being made in building a federal state in Somalia, the process in 2016 has been marked by heavily criticised changes to the electoral process, lack of transparency, and delays. Ongoing political infighting, government reshuffles and confrontations in

19 2017 UN HNO, p. 4.
20 December 2016 SG Report Children and Armed Conflict, para. 60.
central Somalia between clan militias and government forces have resulted in civilian casualties, displacements, and the destruction of civilian property.\textsuperscript{27} The political process has also been marred by the targeted assassination of Somali politicians and authorities continue to face insecurity as a result of Al-Shabaab, an Al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorist organisation.\textsuperscript{28} Al-Shabaab stepped up its use of car bombings during elections to instill security and fear among the civilian population.\textsuperscript{29}

Al-Shabaab remained operational and engaged in guerrilla warfare in other areas of the country, resulting in the intensification of operations against Al-Shabaab in southern and central Somalia.\textsuperscript{30} At present, Al-Shabaab maintains control over large areas of Somali territory including key transportation routes, notwithstanding loss of control of key towns and urban centres and has made some territorial gains at the end of 2016.\textsuperscript{31} It has resorted to asymmetrical attacks against the SNA, AMISOM as well as soft targets “including through ambushes, hit-and-run attacks, suicide bombings and the use of improvised explosive devices, often resulting in heavy civilian casualties, including children”.\textsuperscript{32}

In 2010, Al-Shabaab insurgents began attacking government and AMISOM positions in Mogadishu. SNA/AMISOM operations have, however, made significant territorial gains in operations against Al-Shabaab in central and southern Somalia but have also resulted in indiscriminate killings.\textsuperscript{33} SNA/AMISOM operations saw the liberation of approximately 70 per cent of South and Central Somalia from Al-Shabaab in 2015.\textsuperscript{34} These positive developments were reversed in 2016 as Al-Shabaab stepped up asymmetric and conventional attacks in central and southern Somalia against civilians, civil infrastructure, and AMISOM,

\textsuperscript{29} January 2017 SG Report on Somalia, para. 7.
\textsuperscript{32} December 2016 SG Report Children and Armed Conflict, para. 5. See also 2017 Human Rights Watch Report, p. 537.
\textsuperscript{34} Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, International Development Cooperation, ‘DENMARK – SOMALIA PARTNERSHIP POLICY 2015-2017’ (DANIDA, March 2015), p. 3.
as well as Somali and Kenyan military forces, resulting again in civilian casualties and forcible displacement.\textsuperscript{35}

The FGS maintains control over the capital city of Mogadishu and has extended some influence beyond the city through the federal state-formation process, although the security situation in government-controlled towns remains volatile as Al-Shabaab continues to launch attacks on Mogadishu and other towns under government or allied authority.\textsuperscript{36}

The degree of FGS control over other Somali regions – including the self-declared independent Republic of Somaliland and the semi-autonomous Federal State of Puntland – varies, as they independently exercise security and law enforcement authority.\textsuperscript{37} A trend of regions exercising various levels of local autonomy within Somalia has been noted, including Galmudug in central Somalia declaring as an autonomous (but not independent) region,\textsuperscript{38} and Jubaland, South-West State and Khatumo also assuming greater autonomy.\textsuperscript{39} Al-Shabaab has notably extended its activities into Puntland; however, Puntland and Galmudug Interim Administration forces repelled a large-scale advance.\textsuperscript{40}

Piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia remains an issue, and exacerbates instability by fuelling corruption and crime. Piracy attacks diminished through 2015, due in part to joint SNA / AMISOM operations.\textsuperscript{41} Although maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia is on the decline, Somali pirates are reported to possess the intent and capability to resume attacks.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{40} December 2016 SG Report Children and Armed Conflict, para. 5.
\textsuperscript{41} 2016 Human Rights Watch Report, p. 507.
\textsuperscript{42} United Nations Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia’, UN Doc. S/2016/843 (7 October 2016), para. 5.
Grave violations against children in Somalia are being carried out with impunity and were exacerbated by the breakdown of law and order.\(^43\) The UN has assessed that the Somali humanitarian situation ‘remains worrying’ with risk of famine due to drought looming, and restrictions on humanitarian access exacerbating the humanitarian and human rights crises. The UN reported the denial of humanitarian access in eight incidents in the first half of 2016 and 12 incidents by clan militias, unknown armed elements, Al-Shabaab and the SNA in 2015 as compared to 15 incidents in 2014.\(^44\) Access to children in need ‘remained extremely challenging’, and humanitarian staff have been the targets of attack, with 2015 seeing 17 humanitarian staff killed, including four United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) staff killed in a single Al-Shabaab suicide attack.\(^45\)

2. State, Non-State, and International Actors

a) State Actors

Government Forces

The federal government security forces are composed of its national army (\textit{i.e.} SNA), intelligence services and police and prison forces.\(^46\) The SNA continues to operate in conjunction with clan militias and regional security forces.\(^47\) The lack of structure and control has led to crimes as well as the inability to identify perpetrators of crimes. Recently announced SNA reforms are aimed at improving the army’s ability to maintain control over Somali security.\(^48\) The UN, however, reports that the integration of militia and regional forces into the SNA are underway but are progressing slowly.\(^49\)

Of significant concern, Somali government security forces have been alleged to be responsible for indiscriminate attacks against civilians, sexual violence, arbitrary arrests and detention of children.\(^50\)

\(^{45}\) 2016 SG Children and Armed Conflict Report, para. 119.  
\(^{46}\) December 2016 SG Report Children and Armed Conflict, para. 6.  
\(^{47}\) December 2016 SG Report Children and Armed Conflict, para. 6.  
\(^{49}\) December 2016 SG Report Children and Armed Conflict, para. 6.  
Children in detention have also been reportedly used in custody as informants, identifying Al-Shabaab members.\textsuperscript{51} Civilians have also been collateral victims of hostilities between Somali government forces and Al-Shabaab, and incidents at government-controlled checkpoints have been reported. Government forces have also been criticised for ‘heavy-handed’ responses to public protests and attacks by rebels, resulting in civilian casualties.\textsuperscript{52}

Further, Somali Government forces and allied militias continue to recruit and use children, in spite of commitments to end such practices in 2012. In 2015, the SNA reportedly recruited 218 children to man checkpoints, among other duties, and continues to detain children for their association with armed groups such as Al-Shabaab, with 346 children detained in 2015 alone.\textsuperscript{53} Children have joined the SNA as a result of poverty, lack of livelihood opportunities, and for recruitment purposes, where they receive military training.\textsuperscript{54}

\textbf{b) Non-State Actors}

Numerous armed groups operate within Somalia and its various autonomous regions, including local and clan militias and those armed groups actively seeking to overthrow the FGS.

\textbf{Al-Shabaab}

Al-Shabaab – Arabic for ‘The Youth’ – is an armed group founded in 2006 with roots in Somalia and affiliated to al-Qaeda. Al-Shabaab’s roots lie in the Union of Islamic Courts group which formerly operated in Somalia, although foreign jihadi fighters including some from Western countries have reportedly come to Somalia to join Al-Shabaab.\textsuperscript{55} The group has claimed responsibility for numerous grave violations including the targeting of civilians, both within Al-Shabaab controlled areas and in FGS-controlled areas including Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab is also responsible for carrying out deadly strikes in the region, including a number of attacks in Kenya.

\textsuperscript{51} 2017 Human Rights Watch Report, p. 536.
\textsuperscript{52} 2015 Human Rights Watch Report, p. 483.
\textsuperscript{54} December 2016 SG Report Children and Armed Conflict, para. 26.
The recruitment and use of children by Al-Shabaab has been documented, with estimates that half of its ranks are made up of children.\(^{56}\) Al-Shabaab has reportedly replenished its ranks with children following losses or ahead of new offensives against the SNA what is described as a recurrent pattern of recruitment and use from April 2010 through July 2016.\(^{57}\) While Al Shabaab does command some popular support, the preponderance of youth in its ranks demonstrates their reliance on soldiers who can more easily be coerced, forced, and indoctrinated than adults. Al-Shabaab’s typical means of recruitment are abduction and deception. Al-Shabaab has been documented to recruit children from mosques, Koranic schools, schools, and at religious events.\(^{58}\) On one occasion 555 children were recruited by Al-Shabaab, including 150 children abducted from madrasas in December 2015.\(^{59}\)

Some boys as young as eight years old were bribed or forcibly taken from their homes, schools, and the streets, while girls were recruited through bribery or by force for sexual servitude, marriages, and domestic labour.\(^{60}\) Al-Shabaab has trained children as young as nine years old and used them in combat, including in the use of explosive devices.\(^{61}\) Others are used as spies, carry ammunition, or to perform domestic chores.\(^{62}\) Al-Shabaab was alleged to be responsible for 15 incidents of sexual violence against children in 2015,\(^{63}\) as compared to 19 instances of alleged sexual violence against girls in 2014, including seven instances of girls detained by Al-Shabaab.\(^{64}\)

A pattern of attacks and abuses against children by Al-Shabaab should be noted. In 2014, eight schools were attacked,\(^{65}\) while 2015 saw child suicide bombers used by Al-Shabaab to directly participate in hostilities by attacking civilian targets, military camps, and other government targets.\(^{66}\) During this same

\(^{56}\) December 2016 SG Report Children and Armed Conflict, para. 17.
\(^{57}\) December 2016 SG Report Children and Armed Conflict, para. 17.
\(^{59}\) 2016 SG Children and Armed Conflict Report, para. 113.
\(^{61}\) December 2016 SG Report Children and Armed Conflict, para. 18.
\(^{62}\) December 2016 SG Report Children and Armed Conflict, para. 18.
\(^{63}\) 2016 SG Children and Armed Conflict Report, para. 116.
\(^{64}\) 2015 SG Children and Armed Conflict Report, paras. 148, 150.
\(^{65}\) 2015 SG Children and Armed Conflict Report, para. 151.
period Al-Shabaab was responsible for killing or maiming 138 children,\(^67\) including the public execution of children and at least one attack directed at a hospital.\(^68\)

In 2014, the African Union Mission and the Somali National Armed Forces commenced joint operations against Al-Shabaab and as a result several towns were abandoned.\(^69\) However, Al-Shabaab retains control of large parts of south-central Somalia.\(^70\)

**CASE STUDY – Children and Al-Shabaab\(^71\)**

With the encouragement of his friends, Bashir (not his real name) left home at the age of 14 to join Al-Shabaab, only having a brief opportunity to speak with his family before leaving. He told of children, both younger and older than him, in the ranks of Al-Shabaab and that they were used to retrieve weapons from dead soldiers, and as soldiers and even human shields themselves. Bashir related that he was ‘scared and terrified of being shot’ when he had to fight for the first time, and that on the morning he was captured by AMISOM forces he watched five of his friends die in front of him – an event which still causes him to have nightmares. AMISOM forces initially detained Bashir in military barracks, but once turned over to UNICEF he was transferred to an ‘interim care center’ where he was able to receive the help he needed and is currently studying electrical repairs and dreams of owning an electrical shop.

**Ahl Al-Sunnah wal Jama’a (ASWJ)**

Ahl Al-Sunnah wal Jama’a (also known as Ahlus Sunnah wal Jammah) is a Somali-based Sufi militia\(^72\) which has recently been added to the UN Secretary General’s list of groups which recruit or abuse children.\(^73\) Ahl Al-Sunnah militia controls parts of Galmudug, including its capital. The Somali government entered an integration agreement with the regional militia; however, the group remains under the control of its regional leaders. It has also joined efforts with the Transitional Federal Government in the fight against

---

\(^{67}\) 2016 SG Children and Armed Conflict Report, para. 115. See also 2015 SG Children and Armed Conflict Report, para. 149.

\(^{68}\) 2015 SG Children and Armed Conflict Report, paras. 149, 151.

\(^{69}\) 2015 SG Children and Armed Conflict Report, para. 145.


Al-Shabaab, causing discord among its ranks concern the formation of the Galmudug interim administration, resulting in clashes with the SNA.74

In 2014, ASWJ was documented to have been involved in the recruitment and use of 109 children75 and 40 children in 2015.76 In 2015, ASWJ was responsible for the killing and maiming of three children, the detention of two children, and sexual violence affecting two children.77 In that same year, ASWJ was involved in fighting with government forces in the area of Guri’el, which resulted in civilian deaths and ‘massive displacement’.78 Human Rights Watch estimates that approximately 90 percent of the area’s population of 65,000+ people fled, at least temporarily, due to the violence.79

**Ras Kamboni Movement**

Formed in 2010 as a splinter group of the Ras Kamboni Brigade, the Ras Kamboni Movement (or Ras Kamboni) is an Islamist militia opposed to Al-Shabaab which disbanded in 2010 and is notable for not appearing on either the United States (US) or European Union (EU) lists of designated terrorist organisations.80 The group is best known for its control over the city of Kismaayo, located in the autonomous region of Jubalnad in the South of Somalia, where it was reported that in 2012 the group cooperated with AMISOM and government forces in order to remove Al-Shabaab, which reportedly attempted to control Kismaayo.81 Since then, Ras Kamboni has continued to exercise control of Kismaayo, despite having concluded an integration agreement with the Somali government.82 Madobe, the group’s leader, is the president of Jubalnad and in 2015, upon re-election to the position of president, Madobe promised to continue ‘reconciliation talks’ with the Somali government and other clans.83

---

74 December 2016 SG Report Children and Armed Conflict, para. 9.
75 2015 SG Children and Armed Conflict Report, para. 145.
76 2016 SG Children and Armed Conflict Report, para. 113.
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)

Reports of ISIL operating in Somalia are relatively recent. In April 2016, media sources reported that a new group called ‘Jabha East Africa’, possibly former members of Al-Shabaab, had pledged allegiance to ISIL, and one IED attack in Mogadishu was claimed by ISIL in April 2016. A struggle within Al-Shabaab between al-Qaeda and ISIL factions has been noted, as evidenced by an incident in October 2015 that saw 30 alleged ISIL sympathisers arrested in Jubaland by al-Qaeda supported Al-Shabaab leaders. In October 2016, a group of fighters loyal to ISIL reportedly occupied Qandala on the coast of Puntland. At the end of 2016, this group seized control of territory but later retreated from Puntland security forces.

c) Regional Actors

Regional Security Forces

Autonomous regions such as Puntland and Somaliland have their own security forces, largely composed of clan-based militias operating in Somalia. With the establishment of interim federal administrations, some of the clan-based militias evolved into regional security forces ‘while several others remained separate and operated on the periphery of the Somali National Army’. However, several clan militias clashed with government forces in 2015 due to discord among certain factions unhappy with the establishment of the Galmudug Interim Administration, resulting in civilian casualties. The Security situation deteriorated in Puntland in 2016 when armed clashes between forces loyal to Puntland and those loyal to Galmadug clashed. Despite a ceasefire, heavy fighting continued through the end of 2016.

89 December 2016 SG Report Children and Armed Conflict, paras. 7, 12.
Puntland Forces, the Galmudug Interim Administration, and the Interim Jubba Administration continue to recruit and use children, with a spike in recruitment in 2016.92

**AMISOM**

The African Union has had significant involvement in Somalia in recent years, most notably through AMISOM, a Peace Support Operation under the authority of the African Union and composed of military and police forces from Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Sierra Leone.93 AMISOM was first deployed to Somalia in 2007 to reduce the threat of Al-Shabaab and other armed groups. This mission, with the support of the UN, is tasked with supporting the FGS to restore peace and stability within Somalia.94 Over 22,000 AMISOM troops are deployed within Somalia95 and have been engaged in ‘joint operations’ with Somali government forces with the primary mission of regaining control from Al-Shabaab and other insurgent groups.96

As the result of AMISOM operations, children have suffered from the ensuing violence97 with 60 incidents of killing or maiming of children attributed to AMISOM in 2015.98 There are also verified reports of recruitment and use of children from 2012 through 2014, and in the first half of 2016.99 Children have been used by AMISOM in support functions and to man checkpoints.100 As a result, the UN has engaged with AMISOM on the alarming number of violations committed by its forces against children.101 Reports have alleged that AMISOM has used children in ‘support functions’,102 and two instances of SGBV by AMISOM forces were documented by the UN in 2015.103 In 2014, AMISOM soldiers from Uganda and Burundi were alleged to have been involved in the sexual assault and exploitation of women and girls in Mogadishu, involving allegations of the exchange of sex for assistance including food, medical and humanitarian

---

92 December 2016 SG Report Children and Armed Conflict, para. 29.
96 2015 SG Children and Armed Conflict Report, para. 145.
97 2015 SG Children and Armed Conflict Report, para. 149.
98 2016 SG Children and Armed Conflict Report, para. 115.
100 December 2016 SG Report Children and Armed Conflict, para. 30.
101 2016 SG Children and Armed Conflict Report, para. 121.
102 2015 SG Children and Armed Conflict Report, para. 147.
assistance. In May 2016, 14 AMISOM soldiers allegedly raped two girls aged 15 and 17 in Galgudud region.

Since January 2015, the Dallaire Initiative has had a Child Protection Advisor embedded in AMISOM in Somalia, the first such position in an African Union mission. Over the course of the year, the Dallaire Initiative will be conducting multiple trainings of personnel from AMISOM, and SNA, and the Somali National Police on countering the use of child soldiers, with the support of the British Peace Support Training Team in Kenya. This groundbreaking work will help better protect children in Somalia and enhance the capabilities of Somali and African forces to bring a sustainable end to the conflict.

Kenya

Kenya has directly felt the effects of the Somali conflict, both as the result of Somalis seeking refuge and due to Al-Shaabab staged attacks, including the attacks on the Westgate Mall and Garissa University.

Kenya has sent troops both as part of missions within AMISOM’s command and independently. As the result of concerns for national security and the intensity of refugee flows from Somalia into Kenya, and following a series of foreign tourist kidnappings in 2011, Kenya deployed 2,400 members of the Kenya Defence Force (KDF) in Southern Somalia. In February 2012, these Kenyan troops came under AMISOM control, and have since grown to a presence of 3,364 troops. The KDF continues to support and train Somali-affiliated militias and conduct missions, and has sustained casualties from Al-Shabaab attacks including an assault on the El-Ade camp in January 2016, where conflicting reports place Kenyan casualties around 200 killed.

---

107 December 2016 SG Report Children and Armed Conflict, para. 10.
109 Kenya’s Intervention in Somalia.
Ethiopia

Ethiopia and Somalia have long had a tense relationship, described as one ‘marred by distrust, animosity and war’. In 2011, after several years of absence, Ethiopia sent troops to Somalia, reportedly in support of AMISOM forces. It was not until 2014, however, that Ethiopian troops formally joined AMISOM. In 2015, Ethiopia provided both training and support to militias affiliated with the Somali government, and was involved in negotiations regarding ‘the creation of bordering federal states’.

d) International Actors

UN SOM

UN SOM was established by Security Council Resolution 2012 with the mandate to ‘provide “good offices” functions’ and support the Somali government during the peace process. UNSOM’s mandate requires it to provide policy advice to both the government and AMISOM, in addition to monitoring and reporting functions for the Security Council on the situation in Somalia and in particular with reference to human rights violations, international humanitarian law (IHL) violations, and abuses against children or women.

EU

As part of its diplomatic and security support the EU maintains a Somali delegation, including the Special Envoy to Somalia and Special Representative for the Horn of Africa, in addition to having donated more than €1 billion to Somalia within the recent past. Moreover, three missions have been launched under the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy to assist with military training, combat maritime piracy and the development of ‘maritime capacity’ in Somalia and other states in the Horn of Africa.

121 Somalia and the EU.
United States (US)

The US supports AMISOM and the Somali national forces in operations throughout Somalia and through financial assistance, training, and materiel support. The US intensified air and drone strikes in 2016.\(^{122}\) The most recent report of the UN’s Secretary General on Somalia notes that together with Denmark, the US provided $16.3 million to support the SNA.\(^{123}\) Military assistance has included US drone strikes within Somalia, with three strikes claimed since the end of 2014.\(^{124}\) Human Rights Watch has criticised the US for failing to provide public information concerning civilian casualties in such strikes.\(^{125}\)

### III. Child Protection Concerns

#### 1. Recruitment and Use of Children

The use and recruitment of children is an integral part of the conflict in Somalia, especially for Al-Shabaab. The SNA, Al-Shabaab, AWSJ, regional security forces, AMISOM, and unknown armed elements recruit and use children in Somalia.\(^{126}\) The UN has verified 6,163 (5,933 boys; 230 girls) cases of recruitment and use of children since 2012 by the SNA and armed groups.\(^{127}\) The majority of these cases (70%) are attributed to Al-Shabaab. Although there was a decline in the recruitment of use of children in 2013 and 2014, an upward trend commenced in 2015, followed by a sharp increase in 2016.\(^{128}\) During the first half of 2016, 962 boys and 410 girls were reportedly recruited and used by armed forces and groups.\(^{129}\) It is difficult to ascertain the exact number of children who are associated with armed forces in Somalia. Estimates suggest that up to 5,000 children and youth could be currently associated with armed groups in Somalia.\(^{130}\) This number is likely much higher given challenges in monitoring crimes and accessing affected populations.\(^{131}\)

---

122 December 2016 SG Report Children and Armed Conflict, para. 11.
127 December 2016 SG Report Children and Armed Conflict, paras. 15, 66.
128 December 2016 SG Report Children and Armed Conflict, para. 15.
130 December 2016 SG Report Children and Armed Conflict, para. 15.
Poverty and lack of opportunities are among the factors leading to recruitment in Somalia. Some children in Puntland, for instance, were approached by Al-Shabaab with the false promise of education and livelihood. Al-Shabaab has also used children to pressure their peers to join. Children, however, are also abducted by Al-Shabaab in large numbers and entire villages have been forced to give up their children.

Children as young as nine years old are associated with armed groups in a number of capacities. Boys and girls are used to perform domestic chores and serve as cooks, spies, and porters. Some children, as young as nine years old, are forced to fight or used as suicide bombers or taught to use weapons and sent to the frontline. In 2015, children were reportedly used by ASWJ during fighting with the SNA. Further, children recruited and used by Al-Shabaab are victims of, or exposed to, a number of grave violations during military operations and air strikes.

Information on the whereabouts of children recruited or abducted by Al-Shabaab is difficult to obtain since children are prohibited from contacting friends and relatives and those who contravene this rule are punished. AMISOM states ‘[a]s a result, many of the parents only learn through the media that their child is either dead, injured or captured while fighting for Al-Shabaab’.

The SNA reportedly recruits and uses children, with 117 verified cases from 1 January to 30 June 2016 notwithstanding the Action Plan signed by Somalia to end and prevent the recruitment and use of children in 2012. Children are used for manning checkpoints, as bodyguards, patrolling and conducting security

133 December 2016 SG Report Children and Armed Conflict, para. 20.
137 December 2016 SG Report Children and Armed Conflict, para. 28.
138 December 2016 SG Report Children and Armed Conflict, para. 22.
checks, and as spies.\textsuperscript{141} Notably, children suspected by Al-Shabaab of spying for the SNA or AMISOM were executed.\textsuperscript{142}

A code of conduct prohibiting the recruitment of children was promulgated in 2014, standard operating procedures for the reception and handover of children separated from armed groups were adopted, followed by the establishment of a child protection unit. Further, General Order Number One was issued, prohibiting commanders from employing children, requiring training on the protection of children’s rights in armed conflict, and authorising UNICEF to inspect all military camps to verify that children are not present.\textsuperscript{143} The FGS reiterated its commitment to ending the use of children in 2015.\textsuperscript{144} In December 2016, AMISOM and the FGS met for a three-day workshop in Nairobi, Kenya, and resolved to work together to tackle the use and recruitment of children in Somalia.\textsuperscript{145} Training has also been provided in collaboration with the EU and AMISOM.\textsuperscript{146}

Children in Somalia continue to be detained by the national army and other security forces, Al-Shabaab and other armed groups.\textsuperscript{147} Recently, 66 children were detained in Puntland for their association with Al-Shabaab, 12 of whom have been issued death sentences.\textsuperscript{148} There is particular concern over the treatment of children who have been deprived of their liberty by the Somali government for alleged association with armed groups.\textsuperscript{149} From April 2010 and July 2016, more than 4,000 children benefited from reintegration services.\textsuperscript{150}

2. Trafficking and Child Labour

Somalia is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women, and children who are subjected to forced labour and sex trafficking.\textsuperscript{151} Somalia is reported to be one of the most grievous countries for

\textsuperscript{141} December 2016 SG Report Children and Armed Conflict, paras. 24-25.
\textsuperscript{142} December 2016 SG Report Children and Armed Conflict, para. 26.
\textsuperscript{143} 2015 Worst Forms of Child Labor Report, p. 785.
\textsuperscript{146} December 2016 SG Report Children and Armed Conflict, para. 68.
\textsuperscript{147} 2015 SG Children and Armed Conflict Report, para. 148.
\textsuperscript{148} September 2016 SG Report on Somalia, para. 55.
\textsuperscript{149} 2015 SG Children and Armed Conflict Report, para. 148.
\textsuperscript{150} December 2016 SG Report Children and Armed Conflict, para. 70.
\textsuperscript{151} 2016 TIP Report, p. 405.
trafficking, smuggling and child labour, although it remains extremely difficult to obtain or verify information on the extent of the problem. Generally speaking, victims are primarily trafficked within Somalia from the southern and central regions to Puntland and Somaliland. Traffickers and smugglers prey on children from those regions, many of whom have been internally displaced due to the conflict. Trafficked children may become victims of forced labour or sex trafficking. For instance, there are reports of child brides who have been trafficked to Europe and North America.

It is also reported that most children are labourers within their own homes or family businesses, and engage in crushing stones, domestic work, and the selling or transporting of a mild plant-based narcotic known as ‘Khat’, among other things. Poverty also plays a role in the forced labour or trafficking of children in Somalia. For instance, some Somali child victims of forced labour and sex trafficking are willingly surrendered to people with familial or clan ties.

Displaced persons, and children in particular, are extremely vulnerable to trafficking. Traffickers and smugglers reportedly prey on women and children, mostly Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from southern and central Somalia who are lured under the false promise of lucrative jobs in Europe and North America. Reports have also surfaced of girls being forced to provide sex acts in exchange for food or other amenities which are otherwise free to beneficiaries at IDP camps.

Children are also trafficked outside of Somalia to countries in Europe, the Middle East, and North America. For instance, there are reports of children being trafficked to Saudi Arabia, where they are forced to beg on the streets, and to Kenya, where they are placed into forced labour or brothels. Children are trafficked to Puntland, Djibouti, and Ethiopia for domestic servitude or sexual servitude.

159 2016 TIP Report, p. 405.
along trucking corridors to the Ethiopia-Djibouti border and Kenya for commercial sexual exploitation.\textsuperscript{165} In addition, an estimated 20,000 undocumented Ethiopians in northern Somalia also remain vulnerable to trafficking\textsuperscript{166} and Ethiopian children in Somaliland may be forced to beg on the streets.\textsuperscript{167}

Somalia has implemented a number of programmes in an attempt to strengthen the national criminal justice response to trafficking.\textsuperscript{168} There is, however, no evidence that the programmes were in fact carried out to specifically assist children in other forms of child labour besides being recruited and used by armed groups.\textsuperscript{169} Somalia is not a party to the UN Trafficking in Persons Protocol.\textsuperscript{170}

The FGS is alleged to have failed to investigate or prosecute many trafficking crimes, including those involving officials alleged to be complicit in the facilitation of forced labour and sex trafficking.\textsuperscript{171} In addition, authorities in Somaliland and Puntland have made minimal efforts to combat trafficking.\textsuperscript{172} Somali National Police are responsible for investigating trafficking; however, they are under-staffed and under-trained.\textsuperscript{173} Even though Somalia has established Child Protection Units and other such programmes, research shows no evidence of mechanisms to coordinate its efforts to address trafficking and child labour.\textsuperscript{174}

### 3. Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV)

Two decades of conflict, insecurity, environmental shocks, and widespread use of traditional practices has put women and girls at significant risk of SGBV. SGBV remains widespread and exists at alarming rates in Somalia, with data for the first half of 2016 revealing that 76 per cent of SGBV survivors were IDPs, and 99 per cent were female.\textsuperscript{175} The UN has verified 780 children who were victims of rape and other forms of sexual violence, including five boys.\textsuperscript{176} All parties to the conflict are alleged to have committed SGBV crimes against civilians. In 2015, the UN documented 174 children were affected in 164 incidents of sexual

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{165} 2015 Worst Forms of Child Labor Report, p. 255.
\item \textsuperscript{166} 2015 TIP Report, p. 370.
\item \textsuperscript{167} 2016 TIP Report, p. 405.
\item \textsuperscript{168} 2015 Worst Forms of Child Labor Report, p. 786.
\item \textsuperscript{169} 2015 Worst Forms of Child Labor Report, p. 786.
\item \textsuperscript{170} 2016 TIP Report, p. 407.
\item \textsuperscript{171} 2015 TIP Report, p. 371.
\item \textsuperscript{172} 2016 TIP Report, p. 406.
\item \textsuperscript{173} 2016 TIP Report, p. 406.
\item \textsuperscript{174} 2015 Worst Forms of Child Labor Report, p. 785.
\item \textsuperscript{175} 2015 Worst Forms of Child Labor Report, p. 785.
\item \textsuperscript{176} December 2016 SG Report Children and Armed Conflict, para. 44.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
violence alleged to have been committed by clan militias, unknown armed elements, the SNA, ASWJ and AMISOM. Continued fighting has made children vulnerable to sexual violence, including forced marriage which often occurs in the context of abductions. For instance, one girl was abducted by the SNA and gang-raped by five Somali soldiers in retaliation for her family accepted the marriage proposal of an Al-Shabaab member. In another case, Al-Shabaab abducted a boy and sodomised him. Girls are particularly at risk while conducting routine activities like domestic chores and using a latrine.

The perpetrators of sexual violence vary from region to region. Violence and exploitation perpetrated by the SNA and associated forces, Al-Shabaab, and other armed elements, is more prevalent in the south and central parts of Somalia, given the ongoing conflict. In Puntland and Somaliland, incidence of SGBV is more often than not perpetrated by civilians. However, it is noted that commonalities exist in all three regions in that women and children are also subjected to domestic violence, Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C), and early marriages. UNICEF estimates about one third of all cases of SGBV in Somalia involve victims under the age of 18. The SNA reportedly subjects children to rape and ill-treatment while in detention for their association with armed forces. In 2014, an eight year-old girl was raped in custody.

While the exact figures are unknown, internally displaced women and children are particularly vulnerable to sexual violence and forced marriage. For instance, there are reports of women and girls being provided with humanitarian assistance by soldiers deployed with AMISOM in exchange for sex.

References:

179 December 2016 SG Report Children and Armed Conflict, para. 47.
180 December 2016 SG Report Children and Armed Conflict, para. 47.
183 2015 SG Children and Armed Conflict Report, para. 150; Somalia Gender-Based Violence Working Group, p. 5.
184 Somalia Gender-Based Violence Working Group, p. 5.
185 Somalia Gender-Based Violence Working Group, p. 5.
187 December 2016 SG Report Children and Armed Conflict, para. 36.
However, the monitoring and reporting of rape and other forms of sexual violence remains a challenge as women face extreme social pressure not to report as a result of stigmatisation. A woman who reports sexual violence in Al-Shabaab controlled areas risks being accused of promiscuity or adultery, which Al-Shabaab has punished with beheading or stoning. In other cases, women have been forced to marry the perpetrator as restitution or been forced to pay the government to have cases opened. Typically, SGBV incidents are addressed by Shari’a or Xeer (customary law), whereby justice is delivered by agreement between the perpetrator’s and survivor’s male heads of household.

Although conflict is at the core of SGBV in Somalia, there are persistent inequalities between men and women that place women at particular risk. Girls in Somalia face harmful and discriminatory practices, including FGM/C, with more than 97 per cent of girls aged 7 to 12 years old having undergone the harmful procedure. Women and girls also face forced and early marriage and intimate partner violence, which is prevalent throughout Somalia and generally underreported.

4. Education

Education has been severely disrupted by conflict, with three million Somali children not in school. Children in rural areas and IDP settlements are most impacted, with only 17 per cent of children enrolled in primary schools. Schools continue to be the subject of attack in violation of international humanitarian law. From 1 May to 31 August 2016, 13 attacks were reported on schools and hospitals. In 2015, 24 schools were attacked by Al-Shabaab, the national army and allied militia, clan militias and other unknown armed elements, an increase from the previous year.

---

191 Somalia Gender-Based Violence Working Group, p. 5.
192 Somalia Gender-Based Violence Working Group, p. 5.
194 Somalia Gender-Based Violence Working Group, p. 5.
195 2017 UN HNO, pp. 4, 8.
196 2017 UN HNO, p. 8.
197 2015 SG Children and Armed Conflict Report, para. 151.
199 2016 SG Children and Armed Conflict Report, para. 117.
Of further concern is the use of schools by parties to the conflict. The SNA, Al-Shabaab and clan militias each used schools for military purposes in 2015. In particular, Al-Shabaab has used schools for recruitment, to distribute jihadist materials, and to conduct ‘indoctrination lectures’. This has resulted in many children leaving school due to the threat of recruitment. Al-Shabaab has reportedly coerced teachers into enlisting students and threatened to kill teachers if students did not enlist. At the same time, the national army is reported to have used three schools for military purposes which were later vacated. There are also reports that AMISOM used a school for military purposes during December 2014.

5. Access to Healthcare

Some 3.3 million people are in need of access to essential health services in Somalia. Health capacities throughout the country are said to be severely overburdened, supplies in short supply and services disrupted, especially in conflict, drought and flood-affected areas. Road inaccessibility, the poor security environment, electricity and fuel shortages have severely hampered the delivery of life-saving mechanisms. Hospitals also continue to be the subject of attack in violation of IHL. Between 2012 and 2016, the UN verified 40 incidents of attacks on hospitals, resulting in damage to clinics and healthcare centres, military use, and looting of supplies. AMISOM’s attacks also reportedly involved the looting of medicines. Al-Shabaab was for nearly half of the cases of attacks on hospitals in the first half of 2016. In 2014, 14 hospitals were attacked by Al-Shabaab and unknown armed groups. Healthcare workers also continue to be the subject of attack. In one reported incident, a healthcare worker was abducted by Al-Shabaab to provide medical care to its wounded fighters.

---

201 December 2016 SG Report Children and Armed Conflict, para. 52; 2016 SG Children and Armed Conflict Report, para. 117.
203 2016 SG Children and Armed Conflict Report, para. 117.
204 2016 SG Children and Armed Conflict Report, para. 117.
205 2017 UN HNO, p. 18.
206 2017 UN HNO, p. 18.
207 2017 UN HNO, p. 18.
208 December 2016 SG Report Children and Armed Conflict, paras. 54-55; 2016 SG Children and Armed Conflict Report, para. 117.
209 2016 SG Children and Armed Conflict Report, para. 117.
210 2015 SG Children and Armed Conflict Report, para. 152.
211 2015 SG Children and Armed Conflict Report, para. 152.
Lastly, an estimated 320,000 children under the age of five years are acutely malnourished, with 50,000 children severely malnourished and at risk of death.\textsuperscript{212} The number of children under five acutely malnourished is projected to rise to 850,000 during the course of 2017.\textsuperscript{213} The prevalence of wasting and stunting in Somalia is among the highest in the region and in the world.\textsuperscript{214}

### 6. Maritime Piracy

It has been estimated that nearly 40 per cent of all pirates operating off the coast of Somalia are under the age of 15. Children in maritime piracy and child combatants share a great deal in common, especially in terms of their perceived strategic value.

While some Somali children are forcibly recruited into pirate activity, far more join voluntarily. Such voluntarily enlistment, however, must be understood in terms of the limited choices and opportunities that are available to Somali children in their country. For example, Somali children may view piracy as a means of bettering themselves if they are extremely poor, displaced from their home and communities, separated from their families, denied access to educational or employment opportunities, or exposed to armed conflict.

Security sector actors operating in known pirate towns may encounter children who provide support to pirate gangs. These boys and girls may act as porters, cooks, cleaners, messengers, spies or sex slaves. While there are currently no international legal instruments in place to prescribe the proper handling of children involved in maritime piracy, security sector actors are advised to seek guidance from their superiors whenever they encounter children suspected of being involved in maritime piracy activities.

There are links between recruitment and use of children and child piracy. While direct links between Al-Shabaab and pirate gangs are currently difficult to establish, young people in Puntland and Somaliland have indicated to the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict that some of them had left Al-Shabaab to join piracy groups.\textsuperscript{215} The international community must remain aware

---

\textsuperscript{212} 2017 UN HNO, p. 4.
of this potential link, as it is known ‘that when there is armed conflict there are money trails, so whether or not [youth] are part of Al-Shabaab or whether or not [youth] are part of this particular piracy gang, increasingly the potential to have those two interfaces come together is going to rear its head at some point because there is a lot of money being gained by those who are involved in piracy’. 216

There has been a major decline in piracy off the coast of Somalia: there were 160 attacks off Somalia alone in 2011, 36 per cent of the world total, while in 2015 there were no recorded attacks in any areas frequented by Somali pirates. 217 Oceans Beyond Piracy, a leading NGO on the matter, states, however, that this progress is ‘fragile and reversible’ and that not enough counter-piracy initiatives have taken place on land, leaving piracy gangs intact. 218

Case Study – Local Initiatives against Piracy: Eyl and Bargal Communities

The small community of Eyl, located in Galmudug, which is considered to be at the heart of piracy since the 1990s, has begun to take actions against pirate gangs under the leadership of community elders. A locally driven advocacy campaign was launched to send the message that ‘piracy is haram (forbidden)’. Economic trade with the pirates was frozen and when a notorious pirate leader was unable to purchase a can of Cake for US $100, pirate groups packed up and left. 219 Similarly in Bargal, community members created a community police force with 80 volunteers to keep piracy out after they failed to meet a list of community demands drafted by the community regarding their lifestyle. In particular, residents from Bargal were ‘fed up with thefts, drinking, rowdy behaviour and the unwanted attention piracy brought to the area’. 220

---

220 The Pirate Tapes, DVD, Directed by Roger Singh and Andrew Moniz (2011; Canada: Palmira Productions).
## Annex I: List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASWJ</td>
<td>Ahl Al-Sunnah wal Jama’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGM/C</td>
<td>Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGS</td>
<td>Federal Government of Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IHL</td>
<td>International Humanitarian Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIL</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDF</td>
<td>Kenya Defense Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGBV</td>
<td>Sexual and Gender-Based Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNA</td>
<td>Somali National Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX II: KEY FACTS

Somalia in a Snapshot

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geography</th>
<th>Somalia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Climate:</td>
<td>principally desert; northern monsoon (December to February), moderate temperatures in north and hot in south; southwest monsoon (May to October), torrid in the north and hot in the south, irregular rainfall, hot and humid periods (tangambili) between monsoons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrain:</td>
<td>mostly flat to undulating plateau rising to hills in north</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border countries:</td>
<td>Djibouti (61 km), Ethiopia (1,640 km), Kenya (684 km)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastline:</td>
<td>3,025 km</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>People</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population:</td>
<td>10,817,354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median age:</td>
<td>17.9 years (2016 est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Languages:</td>
<td>Somali (official), Arabic (official, according to the Transitional Federal Charter), Italian, English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic groups:</td>
<td>Somali 85%, Bantu and other non-Somali 15% (including 30,000 Arabs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religions:</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim (Islam) (official, according to the Transitional Federal Charter)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economy</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital:</td>
<td>Mogadishu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major urban areas:</td>
<td>Mogadishu (capital) 2.138 million; Hargeysa 760,000 (est. 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP:</td>
<td>$5.8 billion (2014 est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita:</td>
<td>$400 (2014 etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP by sector:</td>
<td>Agriculture 60.2%, Industry 7.4%, Services 32.5% (2013 est.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Children and youth</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population under age of 25:</td>
<td>62.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment (ages 15-24):</td>
<td>10.6% (2014 est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child labour (ages 5-14):</td>
<td>49% (2006 est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal age of conscription:</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Relevant UN Security Council Resolutions

On the arms embargo/sanctions regime/sanctions committee – Resolutions 733 (23 January 1992); 751 (24 April 1992); 1407 (3 May 2002); 1425 (22 July 2002); 1474 (8 April 2003); 1730 (19 December 2006); 1844 (20 November 2008); 2036 (22 February 2012); 2093 (6 March 2013); 2142 (5 March 2014); 2244 (23 October 2015); 2317 (10 November 2016).

Endnotes


222 It is to be noted that while the last official census was last concluded in 1975, the Somali government launched its first population census in over four decades on 26 May 2015 (See Federal Republic of Somalia, ‘Somalia, 26 May 2015: Government launches first population data since 1975’ (UNICEF, 26 May 2015), available http://www.unicef.org/esaro/5440_som2015_population-data.html accessed 26 January 2017.

Somalia – January 2017

30
On exemptions to the arms embargo/sanctions regime – Resolutions 1356 (19 June 2001); 1916 (19 March 2010); 1972 (17 March 2011); 2060 (25 July 2012); 2244 (23 October 2015).

On anti-piracy – Resolutions 1816 (2 June 2008); 1838 (7 October 2008); 1846 (2 December 2008); 1851 (16 December 2008); 1897 (30 November 2009); 1918 (27 April 2010); 1950 (23 November 2010); 1976 (11 April 2011); 2015 (24 October 2011); 2020 (22 November 2011); 2077 (21 November 2012); 2125 (18 November 2013); 2184 (12 November 2014); 2246 (10 November 2015) 2316 (9 November 2016).

On the United Nations Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) – Resolution 2102 (2 May 2013); expanded and renewed by numerous resolutions since.

On the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), formerly IGASOM – Resolutions 1725 (6 December 2006); 1744 (21 February 2007); expanded and renewed by numerous resolutions since.


On the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea (Eritrea included since 2009) – Resolution 1519 (16 December 2003); Renewed and expanded since.

On the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) – Resolutions 751 (24 April 1992); mandate expanded last time before expansion to UNOSOM II: 775 (28 August 1992).

# Somali Child Protection Legislation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Somalia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• 2012 Provisional Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Juvenile Justice Law (Law No. 36/2007).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Somalia Labour Code (Law No. 65 of 18 October 1972)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Penal Code 1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Criminal Procedure Code (Legislative Decree No. 1 of 1 June 1963)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Civil Code (Law No. 37 of 2 June 1973)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Federal Republic of Somalia Provisional Constitution of 2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Puntland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• 2001 Transitional Constitution of Puntland Regional Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Juvenile Justice Law 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Penal Code 1962</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Somaliland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• 2001 Constitution of the Republic of Somaliland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 2007 Juvenile Justice Law of the Republic of Somaliland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Penal Code 1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The Somaliland National Human Rights Commission Law 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Optional Protocol to the CRC on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (signed 2005, not ratified)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1990)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• International Labour Organization Convention No. 182 (1999) concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1990)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1990)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1985)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1975)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX III: TIMELINE OF NOTABLE EVENTS  223

1960
July: The Somali Republic gains independence and a socialist state is established, led by General Muhammad Siad Barre.

1991
January: Rebel forces oust General Barre. The Somali National Movement (SNM) takes control of northern Somalia (the former British Somaliland) and the United Somali Congress takes control of southern Somalia and Mogadishu. A bloody and intense civil war ensues.
May: SNM declares its secession from Somalia and the establishment of the independent state of Somaliland in northwest Somalia. It becomes the only part of Somalia that is able to maintain a functioning government, but the international community refuses recognition. It serves as an enclave of reconstruction and relative peace.

1992
January: The UN Security Council imposes an arms embargo.
April: UN Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) and a Sanctions Committee are established.
October: US Marines land near Mogadishu ahead of the UN peacekeeping force sent to restore order and safeguard relief supplies.

1993
March: UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) is established.
October: Without knowledge or consent from the UN, US Army Rangers based in Somalia launch an operation to capture General Aidid, the leader of rebel force Somali National Alliance (SNA). In what becomes known as the Battle of Mogadishu, two US Black Hawk helicopters are shot down, eighteen American soldiers are killed, and several hundred SNA fighters and Somali civilians are killed.


Somalia – January 2017 33
1994
March: The US formally withdraws from Somalia.

1995
March: UN Peacekeepers depart and UNOSOM II is fully terminated as the Somali civil war continues. Over the next five years, regional administrations emerge, but the Somali state continues to dissolve. Conflict between rival warlords continue. No stable government emerges to take control.

1996
March: The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is established, superseding the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD). At the time, membership is comprised of Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Kenya, and Uganda. In 2011, South Sudan is to be admitted.

1998
August: Puntland, the northeast region of Somalia, declares itself an autonomous state, in part to avoid the clan warfare engulfing southern Somalia.

2000
The Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) is formed through consolidation of disparate but related Islamic courts. August: Clan leaders and senior figures meet in Djibouti and elect Abdulkassim Salat Hassan president of Somalia. October: Hassan and his newly-appointed prime minister, Ali Khalif Gelayadh, arrive in Mogadishu. Gelayadh announces his government, the first in the country since 1991. The Transitional National Government (TNG) is established under the auspices of IGAD.

2001
April: Somali warlords, backed by Ethiopia, declines to support the TNG.

2002
July: The Security Council redefines and expands the arms embargo.

2004
January: Two dozen or so warlords reach a power-sharing agreement after talks in Kenya. The agreement calls for a 275-member parliament.
October: In the fourteenth attempt since 1991 to restore central government, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is established, superseding the TNG. The TFG elects President Abdullah Yusuf Ahmed. December: Tsunami displaces people on the Somali coast.

2005

February: Somali government officials begin returning home from exile in Kenya, divided about where in Somalia the new parliament should sit. 
April: IGAD decides to send troops to Somalia.

2006

February: Transitional parliament meets in Baidoa for the first time since its establishment in 2004.
May: Scores of people are killed and hundreds injured during fierce fighting between rival militias in Mogadishu, marking the worst violence in nearly a decade.
June: Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) seizes control of Mogadishu from the TFG and takes other parts of southern Somalia. In response, a group of UN Ambassadors and intergovernmental organizations forms the International Contact Group (ICG) on Somalia.
July: Ethiopian troops enter Somalia.
August: Mogadishu’s air and seaports were reopened for the first time since 1995.
September: TFG and UIC begin peace talks in Khartoum. Somalia’s first known suicide bombing target President Yusuf in Baidoa.
December: In response to the UIC encircling the TFG in Baidoa, Ethiopian troops intervene and assist TFG in over-running UIC forces. Ethiopian and TFG forces capture Mogadishu from UIC forces.

2007

January: UIC forces abandon their last stronghold, the southern port of Kismaayo. The UIC is overthrown. In its place, militant wing Al-Shabaab continues to fight against the TFG. Somali President Yusuf enters Mogadishu for the first time since taking office in 2004. The first US military intervention in Somalia since 1993 occurs in the form of air strikes against Al Qaeda figures.
March: AU troops land in Mogadishu amid battles between Islamist insurgents and government forces backed by Ethiopian troops.
July: The International Maritime Organization (IMO) Council requests that the issue of piracy be brought to the attention of the Security Council.

2008

June: The TFG and a wing of the opposition Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) reach the ‘Djibouti Agreement’ on cessation of hostilities. The Security Council passes a resolution authorising actions against piracy and robbery in Somali territorial waters, including dispatch of warships.
July: Ali Osman Ahmed, head of the UN Development Programme’s (UNDP) office in Somalia, is killed.
August: The Djibouti Agreement is formally signed.
October: TFG and ARS agree on a ceasefire effective 5 November 2008. Suicide bombings kill 28 people, including two UN employees.
November: TFG and ARS agree on a power sharing proposal.

2009
January: The last Ethiopian forces leave Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab captures Baidoa, formerly a key government stronghold.
February: Four insurgent groups, including the Eritrea-based faction of ARS, but not Al-Shabaab, announce plans to merge into a new group called Hisbul Islam (Islamic Party) to fight the newly elected president and the anticipated unity government.
April: The Somali parliament unanimously votes to institute Islamic law.
May: Islamic insurgents launch an onslaught on Mogadishu, and advance in the south.
September: US Special Operations forces enter southern Somalia in a daytime helicopter raid and kill Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, believed to be one of the most senior Al-Qaeda leaders in East Africa and one the many foreigners in Al-Shabaab’s insurgency against the TFG.
October: Fighting breaks out for the first time between the two rebel groups Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam. Al-Shabaab recaptures the southern port of Kismayo in the skirmish. The International Maritime Bureau concludes that global piracy attacks significantly increased in 2009 over 2008, mostly due to piracy activity off the coast of Somalia.

2010
January: Al-Shabaab confirms officially for the first time that it has joined Al Qaeda’s ‘international jihad’. UN World Food Programme withdraws from Al-Shabaab controlled areas of southern Somalia after threats to its staff.
February: Al-Shabaab begins to concentrate troops for a major offensive to capture the capital.
March: The TFG and Ahlu Suna Wal Jamma (ASWJ), the pro-government Islamist group in control of part of central Somalia, formally signs a cooperation framework agreement in Addis Ababa.
April: Hisbul Islam reportedly claims loyalty to Al-Qaeda for the first time and invites Osama Bin Laden to Somalia.
June: A special court to try suspected pirates operating in the Gulf of Aden opens in Mombasa, Kenya.
July: Due to increased naval presence in the Gulf of Aden, pirate attacks decline globally nearly 20 per cent over the same six-month period in 2009.
October: Kenya ends its agreement with the EU to prosecute suspected Somali pirates. The AU Peace and Security Council urge the UN Security Council to endorse an increase in the authorised troop strength of AMISOM from 8,000 to 20,000, and impose a naval blockade and no-fly zone over Somalia.
December: The Security Council increases the AMISOM Troop authorisation from 8,000 to 12,000. Pirate attacks on ships worldwide hit seven-year high, with Somali pirates accounting for 49 of 52 ships seized.

2011
February: AMISOM, IGAD, and the UN Political Office for Somalia announce in a joint communique that they have adopted a joint regional strategy to support the TFG in the management of the transitional period.

April: The International Maritime Bureau reports a steep rise in piracy off the coast of Somalia in the first three months of 2011.

June: The Somali president and the speaker of parliament sign the Kampala Accord. Somali government continues to operate in the transitional period under the Transitional Federal Charter.

July: UN formally declares famine in three regions of Somalia. Al-Shabaab partially lifts ban on foreign aid agencies in south, and UN airlifts its first aid consignment in five years to Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab pulls out of Mogadishu in what it called a ‘tactical move’.

September: 13.3 million people are in need of emergency assistance in the Horn of Africa due to the famine.

October: At the invitation of the TFG, the Kenyan Government launches Operation Protect the Country against Al-Shabaab. American military begins flying drones from a base in Ethiopia. Ethiopian troops return to the central Somali town of Guriel (also known as Guriceel).

2012

January: The Security Council authorises an increase in the troop ceiling for AMISOM from 12,000 to 17,731.

February: UN declares an end to famine conditions in Somalia. At the height of the crisis, 750,000 people in the Horn of Africa were at risk of death. People in need of emergency assistance estimated to be 9.5 million. More than 293,000 Somali refugees have fled conflict and famine into neighboring countries of Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Yemen since January 2011.

April: Nearly 260,000 people, half of them children under five, have died in the famine since October 2010. The deaths account for 4.6 per cent of the total population, and 10 per cent of the population of children under five.

May: Al-Shabaab loses key towns of Baidoa and Afgoye to Kenyan, AU, and Somali government forces.

July: The Human Rights Council adopts a resolution on human rights assistance to Somalia strongly condemning grave and systematic human rights abuses committed against the population and calling for all parties to take immediate steps to protect women and children.

August: Somalia’s first formal parliament in more than twenty years is sworn in. Pro-government forces capture the port of Merca south of Mogadishu from Al-Shabaab.

September: In its first presidential election since 1967, parliament elects Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, marking the end of Somalia’s eight-year transitional period. The Security Council adopts a resolution to lay out the expectations for the next phase in Somalia.

October: AU and Somali government forces recapture Kismaayo, the last major city held by Al-Shabaab and the country’s second largest port, and the town of Wanla Weyn northwest of Mogadishu.

November: South Africa and Togo call for a more thorough investigation of allegations of illegal fishing and dumping of toxic waste in the waters off the coast of Somalia.

2013
January: US recognises Somalia’s government for first time since 1991. Leila Zerrougui, the Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, expresses deep concern about the killing of several children during military operations conducted by AMISOM near the southern town of Leggo and urges the AU to strengthen its efforts to minimise child casualties in its operations. AMISOM promises to conduct an investigation.

February: UN Monitors confirm for the first time that there is a link between Al-Shabaab and piracy activities.


May: The Security Council creates UNSOM. Its mandate includes support for AMISOM, capacity building, and human rights monitoring and reporting.

June: Veteran Al-Shabaab leader Sheikh Hassan Dahir is ousted in favor of more extreme figure Ahmed Abdi Godane. Terrorist attacks, already occurring regularly, spike.


November: The Security Council increases AMISOM’s troop ceiling again.

2014

June: Poor weather, conflict-related factors and a lack of funding for humanitarian assistance cause early-warning indicators of an impending famine similar to 2011.

September: Al-Shabaab leader Ahmed Abdi Godane are killed in US drone strike. He is succeeded by Ahmad Omae.

October: The Security Council adopts several sanctions and related measures, including authorising naval deployments to interdict charcoal exports and arms imports violating the sanctions regime and several other reauthorisations.

November: The Somali government launches the country’s first postal service in more than two decades. Mogadishu’s first ever cash withdrawal machine is installed in a hotel.

December: Terrorist attacks by Al-Shabaab continue to occur on a regular basis. Federal parliament of Somalia issues a vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister of the FGS.

2015

February: Parliament approves the cabinet.


April: Multiple Al-Shabaab terrorist attacks occur, including attacks on the Central Hotel and Ministry of Education in Mogadishu, as well as a UNICEF vehicle in Garow. Al-Shabaab claim responsibility for killing 148, mostly Christian students, at Garissa University College in northern Kenya. Kenya carries out air raids on Al-Shabaab bases in Somalia in retaliation.

May: US Secretary of State John Kerry pays brief visit to Mogadishu.

June: Al-Shabaab overruns AU base in Lego village.
July: AU Troops launch Operation Jubba Corridor against Al-Shabaab. MP Abdulahi Hussein Mohamud is killed by gunmen.

September: A high-level meeting on Somalia is held in New York, co-chaired by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, AU Commission Chairperson Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, Organization of Islamic Cooperation Secretary-General Iyad Ameed Madani, and Secretary-General of the League of Arab States Nabil Elaraby. Al-Shabaab takes over Buqda after AU forces leave the area.

October: Islamic extremists kill the Somali president’s nephew in a drive-by shooting.

November: Flooding hits over 90,000 people in southern Somalia—almost half are forced from their homes.

December: Two people with ties to Al-Shabaab carry out a terrorist attack in California, US, killing 14 and wounding 17. Kenya police chief announces 200 Al-Shabaab rebels have split and declared allegiance to Islamic State.

2016

January: Somalia cuts all diplomatic ties with Iran. In southwest Somalia, 63 Kenyan soldiers are killed when Al-Shabaab attacks an African Union base in El-Ade.

February: Government and AU troops recapture the southern port of Merca that Al-Shabaab briefly seized.


April: Several terrorist attacks occur, including a car bomb that kills a child in Mogadishu.

May: Al-Shabaab kills at least 11 government soldiers and retakes Runirgod, just one day after it has been taken by government forces. Al-Shabaab raids the government quarter of Mogadishu, killing 17 people.

June: Al-Shabaab attacks a hotel in Mogadishu, killing 16 people. Ethiopian troops are killed after Al-Shabaab attack on AMISOM base.

October: ISIL reportedly capture a port city in Puntland. At least 10 people, including soldiers and civilians are killed in Al-Shabaab suicide attack in Afgoye. Al-Shabaab suicide bomber drive vehicle into AMISOM base in central Somalia. Sailors held captive since 2012 are released.

November: Leaders of Puntland and Galmudug agree to respect a ceasefire in the disputed city of Galkayo. Fighting in the city reportedly displaces 90,000. Al-Shabaab reportedly attacks police checkpoint in Mogadishu.

December: FGS and AMISOM meet in Nairobi for a three-day workshop and resolve to end the recruitment and use of children. Inauguration of the new Federal Parliament of Somalia.

2017

January: Al-Shabaab suicide bombers attack main peacekeeping base in Mogadishu, killing at least three Somali security officers.
ANNEX IV: RECOMMENDED READING


United States Department of State, ‘Somalia Factsheet’ (30 June 2016).

United States Department of State, ‘Trafficking in Persons Report’ (June 2016).